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ABSTRACT 
 
Jonathan A. Susser: Predicting Prospective Memory: Metacognitive Sensitivity at Encoding 
(Under the direction of Neil W. Mulligan) 
 
Prospective memory refers to our ability to remember to complete future intentions. 
Research on prospective memory has identified factors that influence performance; however, it is 
unclear how sensitive people are to these factors and how aware they are of their prospective 
memory abilities. In retrospective memory, or our memory for events in the past, much is known 
about how people assess their learning, and Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilization framework outlines 
three types of inferential cues thought to influence memory predictions. Koriat classified cues as 
being intrinsic, or properties of the to-be-learned information; extrinsic, or conditions of the 
learning environment; and mnemonic, or subjective indices of acquisition. In the current study, I 
applied Koriat’s framework to predictions of prospective memory. In particular, the study 
examined, at encoding, sensitivity to one intrinsic cue (target-response association) and one 
extrinsic cue (target focality) known to affect prospective memory performance. Experiment 1 
examined target-response association and target focality in a between-subjects design. 
Experiments 2 and 3 manipulated each factor within subjects. Results indicated that judgments of 
prospective remembering are similar to those of retrospective remembering: they are sensitive to 
information intrinsic to the to-be-remembered information but less so to extrinsic cues about the 
learning situation. These findings nicely extend Koriat’s framework to this additional 
metamemory domain. Important next steps will be to assess whether experience with extrinsic 
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cues elevates sensitivity and to study the link between prospective memory predictions and 
control behaviors.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Our lives contain many upcoming tasks and responsibilities: we need to pick up groceries 
from the store, put leftovers in the fridge, relay a message to a friend, and more. Remembering to 
complete such tasks is referred to as prospective memory. In contrast, our memory for events and 
information experienced in the past is known as our retrospective memory. Although the 
majority of memory research has studied retrospective memory, prospective memory research 
has grown in recent decades because of its implications in both basic and applied domains (for 
reviews, see Dismukes, 2010, 2012). Crovitz and Daniel (1984) estimated that half of everyday 
forgetting reflects failures of prospective memory. Due to the numerous prospective demands we 
face, we have developed tools to help us remember. Knots on fingers, pill boxes, and basic 
calendars reflect some of the many aids that ease our prospective memory burdens.  
Presumably, one requirement for using these tools is awareness and knowledge that they 
are needed. In other words, if we are confident we will remember to buy milk at the store after 
work, we may not set a reminder; if we worry we will forget our medication, we might put a pill 
box by our front door. Although some examples of prospective memory are minor, forgetting to 
complete certain tasks can have dire consequences. For example, McDaniel and Einstein (2007a) 
note the horrifying story of a father on his way to work who was supposed to take his child to 
school. The father forgot to drop off his child before arriving at work, and the child eventually 
died.  
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With these issues in mind, it is important to understand people’s sensitivity to their 
prospective memory performance. We know much about how people predict their retrospective 
memory, but little research has examined our ability to judge whether we will complete future 
tasks.  
Metamemory Overview 
How people assess and make decisions about their memory is referred to as metamemory. 
In other words, metamemory reflects people’s awareness of their memory processes. Researchers 
distinguish between two metamemorial processes: monitoring, or the assessment of memory, and 
control, or the decisions we make about our memory (Nelson & Narens, 1990). For example, 
students preparing for an exam may monitor their studying to evaluate what they know and do 
not know, and then use these monitoring assessments to decide whether to continue reviewing 
material or move on to other work.   
How do researchers assess monitoring and people’s judgments about their memory? In a 
typical study, participants learn a list of items one-by-one in preparation for a memory test. 
During encoding, participants make a prediction, often for each individual item, about their 
future memory. The most common prediction is the judgment of learning (JOL), for which 
participants rate their confidence in remembering an item on a scale from 0 (no confidence) to 
100 (extreme confidence). Participants later take the memory test, and objective memory can be 
compared to predictions in a variety of ways to assess the accuracy of the metamemorial 
judgments (outlined in more depth below). Researchers interested in examining how people 
regulate or control their learning may also ask participants to select items to restudy or measure 
how long participants self-pace their restudying.  
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A primary goal of metamemory research is to understand how people make JOLs and 
what information goes into them (for reviews, see Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013; Schwartz 
& Efklides, 2012). If people initially make faulty predictions, their later decisions may likewise 
be faulty, leading to an inefficient allocation of cognitive resources (e.g., Rhodes & Castel, 
2009).  
Memory Monitoring 
Current theorizing views monitoring as an inferential process based on cues in the 
learning environment (e.g., Koriat, 1997; Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, Benjamin, & Bjork, 1997). 
People’s predictions will be accurate to the extent that they use cues that relate to actual memory 
performance. If people rely on cues that are not indicative of memory, their predictions and study 
decisions may be impaired (e.g., Rhodes & Castel, 2009).  
 So what cues do people use when making judgments of future memory? Koriat (1997) 
proposed an influential cue-utilization framework that delineates types of cues people 
incorporate into their JOLs. Specifically, Koriat classified cues into three categories: intrinsic, 
extrinsic, and mnemonic. Intrinsic cues stem from the to-be-learned items and are perceived to 
reveal their ease or difficulty of learning. For example, the relation between items in word pairs 
would be considered an intrinsic cue, as would the concreteness of words, as this information is 
contained within particular items. Extrinsic cues pertain to the conditions of learning or to 
encoding operations applied by the learner. For example, the composition of the list in which 
items are presented, the delay between study and test, and any strategies that people use to aid 
learning (e.g., using mnemonics, generating information) would all be extrinsic cues, as these are 
not intrinsic characteristics of the items under study. Mnemonic cues are indicators of the degree 
of learning of a piece of information based on internal feelings or subjective experience. For 
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example, feelings regarding the ease of learning or producing information would be considered 
mnemonic cues. 
 A key proposal of Koriat’s (1997) framework is that intrinsic cues more strongly 
influence JOLs than do extrinsic cues. More specifically, participants often discount or 
underappreciate the effects of extrinsic factors on memory. Across multiple experiments, Koriat 
provided evidence for this idea by first showing that JOLs effectively tracked item difficulty of 
word pairs (based on the relatedness between the items), an intrinsic cue, but not the number of 
study trials or length of study duration, both extrinsic cues. Although all three of these variables 
affected actual recall performance, participants’ predictions were more sensitive to, and 
consistent with, the effects of the intrinsic information. 
Subsequent research has generally supported the discounting of extrinsic cues in forming 
JOLs (e.g., Carroll, Nelson, & Kirwan, 1997; Castel, 2008; Kornell & Bjork, 2009; Kornell, 
Rhodes, Castel, & Tauber, 2011; Susser, Mulligan, & Besken, 2013; Tauber & Rhodes, 2010; 
but see Begg, Vinski, Frankovich, & Holgate, 1991; Dunlosky & Matvey, 2001). For example, 
Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, and Bar (2004) assessed whether participants were sensitive to the effects 
of differing retention intervals and item relatedness of word pairs. In one experiment, 
participants were told that they would be tested on word pairs either immediately or upon 
returning to the experiment a day or week later. Participants studied the items, made a JOL for 
each one, and ultimately took the memory test. As expected, predictions were sensitive to the 
associative relatedness of words pairs, an intrinsic cue. However, for retention interval, 
predictions were remarkably stable despite actual memory performance declining dramatically 
with increasing interval. Subsequent experiments revealed that people can display some 
sensitivity to retention interval when predictions are made in a within-subjects fashion; however, 
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the effect on recall remained much greater. This pattern of results is intriguing given the salience 
of forgetting in everyday life. Furthermore, Susser et al. (2013) found that JOLs were influenced 
by perceptual characteristics of items (i.e., word font size and auditory clarity), which did not 
actually affect memory, but were not influenced by the composition of the list in which the items 
were presented (i.e., mixed vs. pure), which did.  
Koriat (1997) defined the third category of cues, mnemonic cues, as subjective indices 
that inform the learner how well material has been learned. These mnemonic cues have been 
heavily researched, and the most frequently studied index has been processing fluency, or the 
subjective ease of processing information (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Researchers have 
examined various instantiations of fluency, both when perceiving and producing information, 
and have observed a general pattern: more fluent processing is associated with greater memory 
confidence, even if it is not reflective of greater memory performance (e.g., Begg, Duft, 
LaLonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989; Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998; Besken & Mulligan, 
2013, 2014; Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 2003; Rhodes & Castel, 2008, 2009; 
Susser & Mulligan, 2015; Undorf & Erdfelder, 2011). For example, Benjamin et al. (1998) had 
participants mentally generate answers to trivia questions of varying difficulties. Participants 
pressed a key upon retrieving an answer (used as an index of retrieval fluency) and made a JOL 
for each. Eventually, participants took a memory test. The researchers found that JOLs increased 
for answers that were more quickly retrieved, but recall decreased.   
Measures of JOL Accuracy 
In assessing the accuracy of JOLs, researchers distinguish between absolute accuracy, 
sensitivity, and relative accuracy. Absolute accuracy reflects a comparison between overall 
levels of predictions and recall. For example, if participants predict they will remember 45% of 
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the items (i.e., their average JOLs for a set of items is 45) and actually recall 45%, they have 
perfect absolute accuracy. Overconfidence and underconfidence can similarly be computed by 
comparing participants’ predictions with their memory accuracy.  
The sensitivity of JOLs refers to the extent to which patterns of JOL responses match 
patterns of recall, and is usually assessed in conjunction with a manipulation of memory or 
metamemory. For example, if a variable has similar effects on JOLs and recall, then people 
would seem to be sensitive to the variable. However, a manipulation may affect JOLs and not 
recall (referred to as a metacognitive illusion, see Rhodes & Castel, 2008), recall but not JOLs 
(e.g., Sungkhasettee, Friedman, & Castel, 2011), or both but in opposite directions (e.g., Besken 
& Mulligan, 2014). In these latter cases, people’s awareness of factors influencing memory is 
shown to be poor. Although people can show good sensitivity (e.g., Begg et al., 1989; Koriat, 
2008; Tauber & Rhodes, 2010), they also rely on cues that are not indicative of memory 
performance (e.g., Benjamin et al., 1998; Besken & Mulligan, 2013, 2014; Hertzog et al., 2003; 
Rhodes & Castel, 2008; Susser & Mulligan, 2015). 
A third aspect of JOL accuracy is relative accuracy, which assesses people’s ability to 
accurately predict performance for one item in relation to others. In other words, relative 
accuracy shows whether people can discriminate to-be-remembered items from those not later 
remembered (e.g., Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Relative accuracy is often assessed by 
computing an ordinal measure of association between each participant’s JOLs and recall 
performance, and the most common measure is the Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation (see 
Nelson, 1984). Gamma is positive if items that are subsequently remembered are given higher 
JOLs, and items subsequently forgotten receive lower JOLs. Fortunately, people generally have 
above-chance relative accuracy, and under certain conditions display extremely high levels (e.g., 
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Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991), indicating that we often have awareness of which information is 
more likely to be remembered later. 
Metamemory Conclusion 
Research in metamemory has helped elucidate what people know about their memory and 
how they go about predicting and controlling their performance. Although people are rather 
accurate at deciphering what information will be remembered later (e.g., Nelson & Dunlosky, 
1991), they can fall prey to illusions of memory (e.g., Benjamin et al., 1998; Rhodes & Castel, 
2008, 2009) and may underappreciate the influence of certain learning conditions (e.g., Koriat et 
al., 2004). Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilization framework represents a useful way to classify the cues 
people use to make predictions. Critically, though, the vast majority of research on metamemory 
– and all of the work discussed above – has examined retrospective memory. In other words, 
people are making judgments for information that they will be asked to retrieve later. Despite the 
importance of prospective forms of remembering, much less is known about our metamemorial 
abilities in this domain. 
Prospective Memory Overview 
 Prospective memory refers to our ability to remember to carry out actions or tasks in the 
future. This type of memory is often viewed in contrast to retrospective memory, or the retrieval 
of information from the past. A main difference between the two is the type of retrieval required; 
when being tested on retrospective memory, participants are typically placed in a retrieval mode 
(by the experimenter) and asked to think about information from their past. In prospective 
memory, people must remember to remember; they are often engaged in ongoing activities and 
need to shift attention and remember to complete their intended action at the appropriate place 
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and time (e.g., Graf & Uttl, 2001; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007b). For example, you may be 
walking to class when you pass a friend and realize you need to deliver a message.  
Classifications of Prospective Memory  
Researchers categorize prospective memory into two types: event-based and time-based. 
Event-based prospective memory refers to remembering to complete an action in response to an 
event (e.g., when you see your friend, you need to remember to give a message). Time-based 
prospective memory refers to remembering to complete an action at a certain time or after a 
certain amount of time has elapsed (e.g., taking cookies out of the oven in 15 minutes; McDaniel 
& Einstein, 2007a). The current study is concerned with event-based prospective memory, which 
has been the main focus of research in the field.  
Fulfilling prospective memory intentions requires remembering two pieces of 
information: 1) that an intention needs to be completed (in response to the appropriate event or at 
the appropriate time) and 2) the contents of the intention. The former is often characterized as the 
prospective component of the intention, and could be said to represent prospective memory 
proper. The latter aspect can be considered a retrospective component akin to a cued-recall 
scenario, in that once the intention is initiated, the content or action (e.g., giving the message) 
must be remembered from the prior episode in which it was planned. The majority of prospective 
memory studies use a simple and easy retrospective component (e.g., pressing a single key on the 
keyboard) to better study the prospective component (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007a); however, 
other actions are also used, including saying a single word or phrase aloud to the experimenter. 
Prospective Memory in the Lab 
Although laboratory research on retrospective memory has been conducted for many 
decades, controlled experimental investigation of prospective memory began more recently. 
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Einstein and McDaniel (1990) pioneered such an investigation by designing a paradigm that is 
still widely used today. In a typical experiment, participants are engaged in an ongoing task; for 
example, they may rate the pleasantness of words. This aspect of the paradigm is supposed to 
represent being occupied by everyday activities. Participants are also instructed to perform an 
action at a point later in the experiment. This is the prospective memory intention. For example, 
participants may be asked to press a key when they encounter a particular word (i.e., the target 
word). Prior to the start of the ongoing task, researchers include a delay so the prospective 
intention does not stay in working memory, which would make the task a vigilance one (Uttl, 
2008). Then, the ongoing task begins, and the target word(s) is presented a certain number of 
times. Prospective memory performance is generally calculated as the number of times 
participants complete the action out of the total number of target presentations. 
Factors Influencing Prospective Memory 
 Using Einstein and McDaniel’s (1990) laboratory paradigm, researchers have 
investigated factors that affect prospective memory success (e.g., Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 
1994; Einstein et al., 2005; Hicks, Marsh, & Cook, 2005; Loft & Yeo, 2007). Three factors that 
have received considerable attention are the focality of the target, the distinctiveness of the 
target, and the relation between the target and action or response. 
 Target focality refers to the type of processing fostered by the target in the context of the 
ongoing task in relation to its initial encoding (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). A target is 
considered focal if its features emphasized in the ongoing task are consistent with the features 
that are emphasized at encoding. In other words, the nature of target processing during the 
ongoing task and at initial encoding overlap. A target is considered non-focal when the 
processing of the target during the ongoing task and at encoding differs. For example, if the 
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prospective memory intention requires participants to respond to a particular syllable found in 
words and the ongoing task is to determine whether one word is an exemplar of a category word, 
the target would be non-focal; processing the syllable is not necessary for completing the word-
categorization task. On the other hand, if the intention requires participants to respond to a 
particular exemplar, the processing is consistent, and the target would be focal (see Einstein & 
McDaniel, 2005).   
Focal targets, due to their overlap in processing, typically lead to better prospective 
memory than do non-focal targets (e.g., Einstein et al., 2005; McBride & Abney, 2012; McBride, 
Beckner, & Abney, 2011; Scullin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2010). For example, Einstein et al. 
(2005, Experiment 2) had participants perform a word-categorization task while holding the 
intention of pressing a key upon encountering a target. For half of the participants, the target was 
a focal, single word; for the other half, the target was the syllable tor. In both conditions the 
target occurred four times throughout the categorization task. Einstein et al. found enhanced 
prospective memory performance for the focal as compared with the non-focal target.  
McBride and Abney (2012) examined focality in a different manner. Rather than 
manipulating the nature of the target, they kept the target constant and manipulated the ongoing 
task in which it occurred. The prospective memory intention was to press a key whenever a word 
with repeated, consecutive vowels was seen (e.g., moose; there were six targets total). For the 
ongoing tasks, participants had to indicate whether a word contained three or more vowels (the 
focal condition), whether a word contained three or more syllables (a non-focal condition), or 
whether a word represented something living or non-living (a second non-focal condition). 
Similar to the results of Einstein et al. (2005), prospective memory performance was better for 
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participants in the focal condition than the two non-focal conditions, who displayed similar 
accuracy.  
The distinctiveness of the target in its surrounding context can also influence prospective 
memory (e.g., Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 1994; Cohen, Dixon, Lindsay, & Masson, 2003; 
McDaniel & Einstein, 1993). For example, Brandimonte and Passolunghi (1994) assessed both 
target distinctiveness and familiarity in the context of a short-term memory ongoing task. To 
manipulate distinctiveness, targets were presented either in all capital letters or in lowercase 
(consistent with the rest of the words). To manipulate familiarity, participants either received a 
high-frequency target (house) or a low-frequency target (chrism). Targets were presented eight 
times total. Results showed enhanced prospective remembering for both distinctive and 
unfamiliar targets. 
Most studies on prospective memory focus on people’s memory for the prospective 
component of the intention; these studies are interested in how people know when to carry out an 
action. To answer this question, the retrospective component of the intention is kept consistent 
across conditions and made very simple, such as the press of a single key on the keyboard. Other 
studies, however, are interested in how the association between the target and action affects 
performance (e.g., Loft & Yeo, 2007; Marsh, Hicks, Cook, Hansen, & Pallos, 2003; Pereira, 
Ellis, & Freeman, 2012).  
 Cohen, West, and Craik (2001) had participants study picture-word pairs for a later test. 
Embedded in this study phase were prospective memory intentions consisting of a picture and 
accompanying phrase. Participants were told that if they encountered a target picture in the later 
test phase, they should say the phrase aloud to the experimenter. There were 24 intentions in 
total, one-third being highly related (e.g., target = patient in doctor’s room, phrase = I must go to 
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the doctor); one-third being somewhat related (e.g., target = ambulance, phrase = I must go to the 
doctor); and one-third being unrelated (e.g., target = hot air balloon, phrase = I must go to the 
doctor). If participants could not remember a particular phrase but did recognize a target, they 
notified the experimenter.  
Cohen et al. (2001) scored prospective memory performance in three ways. To measure 
overall performance, Cohen et al. assessed the number of correct phrases retrieved from each of 
the three conditions (8 targets in each). To measure the prospective component specifically, 
Cohen et al. examined the number of times participants identified a target, regardless of whether 
the phrase was remembered correctly. To measure the retrospective component specifically, 
Cohen et al. examined the number of correct phrases reported as a proportion of the identified 
targets. Results indicated that overall prospective memory performance decreased as the relation 
between the target and action weakened. Relatedness had this same effect on the individual 
prospective and retrospective components, but had a larger effect size for the latter.  
Subsequent research on the effects of relatedness has not parsed out the prospective and 
retrospective components; however, to minimize the role of the former, the targets are kept the 
same for all intentions. For example, Marsh et al. (2003, Experiment 4) had participants learn 
eight target-response word pairs.
1
 Some participants received pairs that were related (e.g., dog-
food), while other participants received pairs that were unrelated (e.g., dog-album). All 
participants saw the same targets, but those in the unrelated condition had the response words re-
paired (see also Pereira et al., 2012). Participants’ task was to say the response word aloud upon 
                                                          
1
For simplicity, I will refer to these intentions as target-response intentions throughout the rest of 
this paper. The target is the prospective memory target, and the response is the content of the 
action.
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encountering the target during a lexical decision task. Marsh et al. found better performance for 
the related pairs. 
Retrieving Intentions 
In addition to understanding the factors that affect prospective memory, another 
important question is how people retrieve intentions upon the appearance of a target. In 
particular, researchers debate whether prospective memory retrieval occurs spontaneously when 
the target is presented or if a form of monitoring is necessary (e.g., Einstein & McDaniel, 2005; 
Loft & Yeo, 2007; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007a, 2007b; Smith, 2003; Smith, Hunt, 
McVay, & McConnell, 2007).
2
 Although not the focus of the current study, I will describe the 
different perspectives briefly here. 
Monitoring. Monitoring in prospective memory is thought to be a capacity-demanding 
process driven by the need to retrieve an intention, and is often assessed by examining costs to 
the ongoing task. The preparatory attentional and memory processes (PAM) theory, outlined by 
Smith and colleagues (e.g., Smith, 2003, 2015; Smith et al., 2007), has received the most 
support. The theory proposes that successful prospective remembering relies on preparatory 
monitoring processes that scan the environment for potential targets and that are always engaged 
when targets are expected to occur. However, the monitoring does not need to be in the focus of 
attention at all times; it can occur peripherally outside of focal awareness, though still consuming 
cognitive resources. Furthermore, this preparatory monitoring is flexible and will be most active 
in the “performance interval” or “the particular spatial-temporal constraint defining the 
                                                          
2
Monitoring in metamemory refers to how people judge, assess, or predict their memory. 
However, monitoring in prospective memory refers to the use of resource-demanding attentional 
allocation to prepare to carry out intentions. I will try to make the appropriate meaning of the 
word evident through the surrounding context.
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circumstance under which carrying out ... the intention will complete the original intent” (Smith 
et al., 2007, p. 742; see also Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2006).  
To examine this form of preparatory monitoring, Smith (2003) had participants respond 
to six different prospective memory targets in the context of a lexical decision task in which 
reaction times (RTs) were assessed. One group of participants was told to respond to the targets 
immediately by pressing a key, while another group delayed its response until after the lexical 
decision task. According to the PAM theory, lexical decision times should be slower, throughout 
the entire task, in the immediate than delayed prospective memory group, as only the former 
needs to prepare to respond. This is what Smith found. Furthermore, participants who were more 
accurate on the prospective task exhibited slower RTs, suggesting a resource-demanding 
monitoring process that is related to prospective memory success. 
 Spontaneous retrieval. In their early prospective memory study, Einstein and McDaniel 
(1990) had participants rate how often they thought about the intention throughout the 
experiment. Participants reported rather low levels of monitoring, yet still performed accurately 
on the prospective memory task. Although such a questionnaire is not foolproof, it does denote 
the possibility that other routes can lead to successful prospective memory. In contrast to the idea 
that a capacity-consuming process is required, McDaniel and Einstein (2007b) have argued that 
more spontaneous target-driven processes can also support performance. They go on to say that 
people may be biased to use this route because it would be costly for a monitoring process – even 
one on the periphery of attention (Smith et al., 2007) – to be constantly engaged (e.g., Einstein & 
McDaniel, 2005; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007a). With spontaneous retrieval, the prospective 
memory target, upon appearance, would trigger retrieval of the intended action.   
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 In one demonstration of this mechanism, Einstein et al. (2005, Experiment 3) had 
participants proceed through a sentence completion task in which they had to judge whether a 
word fit into a sentence. Participants completed two blocks of the task: a baseline block (with no 
prospective memory intention) and a prospective memory block that asked participants to press a 
key in response to a target word in the sentences. Participants either responded to four out of six 
potential prospective memory targets (consistent with Smith, 2003) or a single target, four times. 
Response times were gathered in both blocks. The researchers found that prospective memory 
performance was equivalent (and high) in both conditions. However, ongoing-task costs 
(comparing the baseline to prospective blocks) were only found in the six-target condition. The 
results indicate that people can demonstrate good prospective memory without costs to ongoing 
activities, providing evidence for spontaneous processes.  
 Multiprocess framework. To accommodate both monitoring and spontaneous retrieval 
processes supporting prospective memory, McDaniel and Einstein (2000; see also Einstein & 
McDaniel, 2005, 2010; Einstein et al., 2005) proposed a multiprocess framework that outlines 
circumstances under which each process ought to be engaged. These researchers argued that 
conditions of the task (e.g., the importance of the intention, the expected delay between encoding 
and retrieval, the number and nature of targets) and of the individual (e.g., cognitive or 
personality differences) may encourage one route over the other (but see Smith, 2010).
3
  
Researchers include target focality as one factor that can alter the type of retrieval used; 
non-focal targets are thought to need more monitoring to be retrieved, while focal ones can be 
retrieved through spontaneous mechanisms. The multiprocess framework’s proposed relation 
                                                          
3
Though not the focus of the current study, this proposal implies an element of metacognition in 
prospective memory. In other words, participants may be sensitive to variations in prospective 
memory conditions and allocate attention accordingly (e.g., Einstein & McDaniel, 2008; Hicks et 
al., 2005; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).
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between the focality of the target and the type of processing implies that factors that impact the 
amount of attentional resources available (e.g., divided attention, task importance, aging) ought 
to have larger effects when targets are non-focal than focal (e.g., McDaniel & Einstein, 2007a). 
This assumption has generally been borne out (e.g., Einstein et al., 2005; Kliegel, Jäger, & 
Phillips, 2008; Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2004; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; cf. 
Loft & Yeo, 2007).  
Prospective Memory Conclusion 
 Laboratory research on prospective memory has thoroughly investigated how we 
remember to carry out our intentions and the variables that influence performance. Multiple 
routes can lead to successful retrieval, and a variety of factors determine how we approach our 
intentions (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & Breneiser, 2004; Smith, 
2003). This finding – that intentions can be completed in different ways – suggests a role for 
metacognition in the allocation of attention (Hicks et al., 2005; Smith, 2015), but direct 
investigations of how people monitor their prospective memory are limited. 
Metamemory Monitoring in Prospective Memory 
 People appear to be aware of the nature of prospective memory targets and can allocate 
attention accordingly to achieve adequate performance (e.g., Einstein et al., 2005; Marsh et al., 
2006; see also Einstein & McDaniel, 2008). Surprisingly, little research has explored the more 
basic capacity of how people predict – at encoding – their future prospective memory, a line of 
work that can shed light on people’s use of tools to facilitate remembering (see Smith, 2015, for 
a recent overarching framework). As Meeks, Hicks, and Marsh (2007) note, “... at the time 
people form an intention they must decide concomitantly just how much environmental support 
they are going to need to actually accomplish the task” (p. 998; see also Gilbert, 2015). These 
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aids can be thought of as the control components of prospective memory, and being able to 
accurately predict our performance would allow us to more efficiently use them (see, for 
example, Marsh, Hicks, & Landau, 1998). Furthermore, Hicks et al. (2005) proposed that people 
decide how to allocate their attentional resources based on their predictions of prospective 
memory success (see also Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2005).  
The few studies that have directly examined predictions of prospective memory have 
uncovered intriguing results; however, they have used a variety of methods – both to assess 
prospective memory and metamemory – that makes it difficult to draw clear conclusions. For 
example, some studies have used item-by-item JOLs, while others have used aggregate 
judgments. Item-by-item predictions allow researchers to get fine-grained examinations of 
specific target influences on predictions (e.g., Schnitzspahn, Zeintl, Jäger, & Kliegel, 2011); a 
potential limitation of aggregate judgments is they are typically made without participants 
knowing the actual targets (e.g., Meeks et al., 2007). In general, the research has been concerned 
with the absolute accuracy of people’s predictions, and typically finds that people are 
underconfident (e.g., Knight, Harnett, & Titov, 2005; Meeks et al., 2007; Schnitzspahn et al., 
2011). Certain studies have also examined sensitivity to prospective memory manipulations (e.g., 
Meeks et al., 2007).   
 Meeks et al. (2007) provided the first controlled laboratory investigation of prospective 
memory and metamemory. In the context of a lexical decision task, participants were asked to 
respond to various targets. For some participants, the targets were animal words, and for others, 
they were words containing the syllable tor. During encoding, participants predicted the 
percentage of targets (out of eight total) they expected to find. Participants also completed the 
Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ; Smith, Della Sala, Logie, & 
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Maylor, 2000), a self-report questionnaire that assesses particular everyday retrospective and 
prospective memory performance and failures, such as “Do you fail to mention or give 
something to a visitor that you were asked to pass on?” 
 Although prospective memory performance was better for the animal than syllable 
targets, predictions were similar for the two and exhibited underconfidence. In the animal 
condition, predictions significantly correlated with performance, suggesting that participants had 
some sensitivity to their performance, at least for certain intentions. Additionally, negative 
correlations between PRMQ scores and predictions suggested that participants may have used 
their knowledge of their own everyday memory failures to judge their current performance. The 
researchers also found that participants in the syllable condition performed the ongoing task 
more slowly, a result partially consistent with the proposal of Hicks et al. (2005) in that 
participants may had recognized this task to be more difficult (however, predictions were not 
associated with ongoing task latencies).  
 In a similar fashion to Meeks et al. (2007), Meier, von Wartburg, Matter, Rothen, and 
Reber (2011) examined people’s sensitivity to a cue-specificity manipulation; some participants 
were given a specific target word to respond to (the word trumpet) and others were a given a 
general category (a word that is a musical instrument). The ongoing task had participants view 
short lists of word-object pairs, in which they read the word and remembered the object. 
Predictions were made using a 6-item questionnaire that assessed both the prospective and 
retrospective components of prospective remembering, and one average score was then 
computed. Results showed no difference in predictions or prospective memory performance for 
the two types of targets. 
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 Schnitzspahn et al. (2011) directly tied phenomena from the retrospective JOL literature 
to the study of prospective metamemory: they examined whether JOLs (both based on the 
prospective and retrospective components) would display the delayed-JOL effect (see Rhodes & 
Tauber, 2011) and the underconfidence-with-practice effect (see Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 
2002).
4
 The former effect is the finding that JOLs made immediately after studying items are less 
accurate than JOLs made at a delay. The latter effect is the finding that JOLs tend to initially be 
overconfident, but with repeated study trials, become underconfident.  
For the ongoing task, Schnitzspahn et al. (2011) had participants read a story in 
preparation for a later test. Within the story were prospective memory target words (10 total); 
participants were asked to click on these targets (e.g., Cappuccino) and then type in an associated 
phrase (e.g., Clean glasses). To examine the JOL phenomena, participants were presented with 
either one or three encoding trials of the prospective memory intentions, making JOLs for half of 
the intentions immediately and the other half after a delay. The JOLs for the prospective 
component (i.e., prospective JOLs) assessed the likelihood of recognizing a target as a target. 
The JOLs for the retrospective component (i.e., retrospective JOLs) assessed the likelihood of 
recalling the actual content of a particular target. For example, for the prospective memory 
intention Cappuccino-Clean glasses, participants, effectively, rated the probability that they 
would become aware that an action needed to be taken when they encountered Cappuccino 
                                                          
4
Einstein and McDaniel (2008) note that assessing predictions of prospective memory is complex 
due to the dual prospective and retrospective components of intentions. Although people may 
have high confidence in the particular action to-be-carried-out (e.g., buying milk), they may not 
be as confident in remembering when to perform the action (e.g., on the way home from work). 
Therefore, obtaining separate predictions for the two components or making people aware of this 
distinction may be beneficial. 
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during the ongoing task (the prospective component).
5
 They also rated the probability that they 
would become aware of the phrase Clean glasses when encountering Cappuccino (the 
retrospective component).   
 Regarding the delayed-JOL effect, delayed JOLs – for both components of the intention – 
had better relative accuracy than immediate JOLs. Regarding the underconfidence-with-practice 
effect, all participants were underconfident in their prospective JOLs. The retrospective JOLs, 
though, revealed a different pattern: participants in the one-encoding condition were 
overconfident, but those in the three-encoding condition were underconfident – the typical 
underconfidence-with-practice effect. Importantly, these results demonstrate that processes 
involved in making predictions of prospective memory resemble those from the retrospective 
metamemory literature. 
The Current Study 
 Given the abundance of research on metacognitive monitoring in the retrospective 
domain (e.g., Bjork et al., 2013; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Koriat, 1997) and the lack of such 
research in the prospective domain (cf. Meeks et al., 2007; Meier et al., 2011), the current study 
explores people’s insight into their own prospective memory by assessing their sensitivity to 
factors known to affect performance. This study also examines whether people can distinguish 
between the two components of prospective memory intentions: prospective and retrospective. 
To guide this study, I used Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilization framework. As noted earlier, Koriat 
outlined three types of inferential cues that people use to make their JOLs: intrinsic, or cues that 
pertain to the particular items being judged; extrinsic, or characteristics of the study 
                                                          
5
Schnitzspahn et al. (2011) did not name the specific prospective memory elements when 
obtaining their JOLs, instead using generic superordinate categories. For example, for the 
intention Cappuccino-Clean glasses, the prospective JOL read, “How probable is it that you will 
become aware that something has to be done upon encountering a beverage” (p. 22).  
21 
 
environment; and mnemonic, or subjective indices of learning. Koriat proposed that intrinsic 
cues are often attended to while extrinsic cues are less so, and it is unclear whether this idea 
holds in prospective memory.   
 For the current experiments, I chose to examine one intrinsic cue and one extrinsic cue. 
For the intrinsic cue, I selected target-response association strength. The relatedness of targets to 
responses has been found to influence the fulfillment of intentions (e.g., Marsh et al., 2003; 
McDaniel et al., 2004; Pereira et al., 2012; cf. Loft & Yeo, 2007), such that related targets and 
responses typically lead to better performance. Similarly, in retrospective metamemory, the 
relation between items in word pairs is a strong intrinsic cue that people use, giving higher 
predictions to related than unrelated pairs (e.g., Dunlosky & Matvey, 2001; Mueller, Tauber, & 
Dunlosky, 2013; Soderstrom & McCabe, 2011; Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015). 
 For the extrinsic cue, I chose target focality. As explained above, focality refers to the 
way the prospective memory target is processed at encoding in relation to how it is processed 
during the ongoing task (see McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). A target is considered focal when 
processing is matched (e.g., the target is the word horse and the ongoing task is lexical decision, 
which requires the processing of letters as words or not). A target is considered non-focal when 
processing is mismatched (e.g., the target is the word horse and the ongoing task is counting 
vowels). Prospective memory performance is typically enhanced for focal as compared with non-
focal targets (e.g., Einstein et al., 2005; McBride & Abney, 2012). Focality is a condition of the 
learning context and therefore would be considered an extrinsic cue in Koriat’s (1997) 
classification.  
 The present study extends the prior literature by using an influential metamemory 
framework to examine people’s sensitivity to factors known to affect prospective memory 
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performance. Furthermore, this study addresses some of the limitations of the prior research 
(e.g., Meeks et al., 2007) by having participants make predictions (in typical JOL fashion) for 
both prospective and retrospective components on specific target items. 
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CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 1 
 Experiment 1 examined whether participants are sensitive to the effects of target-
response association and target focality, intrinsic and extrinsic cues respectively according to 
Koriat’s (1997) classification. Both factors have been found to affect prospective memory 
performance (better accuracy for related intentions and focal targets; e.g., Einstein et al., 2005; 
Marsh et al., 2003; Pereira et al., 2012). To remain consistent with the prospective memory 
literature, both factors were manipulated between subjects.  
 Regarding focality, I manipulated the ongoing task participants engaged in, similar to 
McBride and Abney (2012). This format allowed me to keep the prospective memory targets 
consistent across conditions and allowed all participants to make JOLs on individual words 
(rather than syllables or word categories, which have been used as non-focal targets in previous 
research). As will be detailed below, the focal and non-focal ongoing tasks were made as 
comparable as possible.  
Based on the prospective memory literature (e.g., Marsh et al., 2003; McBride & Abney, 
2012), actual memory performance should be better for the focal than non-focal targets (on the 
prospective component) and for related than unrelated intentions (on the retrospective 
component). Based on the cue-utilization framework of JOLs (Koriat, 1997), JOLs should show 
sensitivity to target-response association but should discount the effect of focality. An open 
question is whether participants will be able to distinguish between the two components when 
making their JOLs. 
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Method 
Participants 
One hundred and seven undergraduate students from the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill participated in exchange for course credit. Two participants failed to follow 
instructions for the ongoing task (and their performance on the ongoing task was ~60%), and 
their data were not used. The data from one additional participant were lost due to a computer 
malfunction. Therefore, the final data set consisted of results from 104 participants, 26 in each of 
the four conditions 
Materials and Design 
 The design was a 2 (target-response association: related vs. unrelated) x 2 (focality: focal 
vs. non-focal) between-subjects design. Stimuli for the ongoing tasks were obtained from the 
English Lexicon Project (Balota et al., 2007) and consisted of 90 words and 82 pronounceable 
non-words (172 items total), all ranging from 4-6 letters in length. Half of the words and non-
words contained more than two vowels. Sixteen of the words were critical items and used as 
targets for the prospective memory task. These were randomly halved and counterbalanced to act 
as old/new items on the recognition test at the end of the experiment. Because the targets were 
words and therefore all received the same [word] response in the lexical decision task, they also 
all contained two or fewer vowels so that they likewise all received the same response in the 
vowel counting task. In all, there were 164 ongoing task trials per participant. 
 The “study list” of prospective memory target-response intentions consisted of eight 
targets paired with either a related or unrelated response word.  Related target-response pairs 
were formed by choosing the most frequent associate of each target word based on the 
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University of South Florida word association norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). 
Unrelated target-response pairs were formed by randomly re-pairing the related pairs. 
The “test list” used for the lexical decision and vowel counting ongoing tasks consisted of 
the 164 words and non-words. The items in this list were randomly ordered anew for each 
participant with the constraint that a random prospective memory target appeared every 20 trials. 
The recognition test consisted of all 16 critical items, the eight targets seen previously 
and the eight new items.   
Procedure 
 The study consisted of five main phases: instruction for the ongoing task; instruction, 
encoding, and prediction for the prospective memory intentions; a delay; the ongoing task; and 
the recognition and cued-recall tests. First, participants were told about the ongoing task, which 
was referred to as the “letter strings task.” Participants in the focal condition were informed that 
a little later in the experiment they would see individual letter strings on the computer screen and 
that their goal would be to classify them as either words or non-words as quickly and accurately 
as possible. Responses were made by pressing the D (word) and K (non-word) keys. Each trial 
consisted of three parts. The first was a “waiting” screen, and participants pressed the Space Bar 
to begin the trial. The second was a brief (250 ms) delay. The third was the letter string, which 
remained visible until the participant made a response. 
In a similar fashion, participants in the non-focal condition were informed that a little 
later in the experiment they would see individual letter strings on the computer screen and that 
their goal would be to determine the number of vowels each string contained as quickly and 
accurately as possible. Responses were made by pressing the D (two or fewer vowels) and K 
(more than two vowels) keys. Each trial consisted of three parts. The first was a “waiting” screen, 
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and participants pressed the Space Bar to begin the trial. The second was a brief (250 ms) delay. 
The third was the letter string, which remained visible until the participant made a response.  
After the researcher was confident that participants understood the instructions, the 
researcher explained that a second goal of the experiment was to see how people remember to 
complete intentions in the future. Participants were told that they would be shown pairs of words, 
with the first word of a pair being the “target” and the second word being the “response.” They 
were also given an example. Participants were then instructed that if they encounter a target word 
later, during the letter-strings task, they should notify the researcher and try to say the associated 
response word aloud. If this response word was forgotten, the participant was told to still identify 
the target and let the researcher know. This type of responding allowed measurement of both the 
prospective and retrospective components of the intention (detailed below). 
To encode the prospective memory intentions, participants were shown, in a random 
order, the eight target-response pairs for 8 seconds each. They were asked to say each pair aloud, 
and after the 8 s rated their confidence (i.e., made their JOL) in remembering the intention. 
Participants made two confidence ratings for each intention. The first rating (the prospective 
JOL) assessed participants’ ability to remember that they had to do something upon seeing the 
target word later. The second rating (the retrospective JOL) assessed participants’ ability to recall 
the particular response word, given they noticed the target. Both ratings were made on a scale 
from 0 (not confident at all) to 100 (extremely confident), and participants were encouraged to 
use the entire scale. 
Next, participants were given a word-stem cued-recall memory test on the target-response 
intentions to ensure they were learned. Participants first saw the first two letters of a target and 
were asked to complete it and say it out loud.  After retrieving (or attempting to retrieve) the 
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target, participants pressed the Spacebar and were given feedback (i.e., were shown the target). 
Participants pressed the Spacebar again and proceeded to a blank screen at which they attempted 
to retrieve the associated response word. After attempting to retrieve the response, participants 
pressed the Spacebar and were given feedback (i.e., were shown the response). This was 
repeated for all eight intentions. Then, participants provided the same two JOLs as above. This 
design enabled participants to report their confidence upon initial learning and once intentions 
had been studied and tested. 
After the encoding and predicting of intentions, participants completed a three-minute 
math distractor task to remove the intentions from working memory. Next, participants were 
reminded of the ongoing task (either lexical decision or vowel counting) and performed the task. 
No reference was made to the prospective memory intentions. At the end of the experiment, 
participants completed an old/new recognition test of the targets, followed by a cued-recall test 
of the target-response pairs. In the recognition test, participants saw a focus point (+) for 500 ms, 
a blank delay for 200 ms, and then a critical test word. Participants responded using the O (old) 
and N (new) keys. In the cued-recall test, participants were given a sheet of paper listing the 
prospective memory targets and wrote the associated response for each one. At this point, 
participants who had failed to identify any target words during the ongoing task were asked 
whether they remembered the prospective memory aspect of the experiment at all. Participants 
were then debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
 To start, the recognition data revealed that participants effectively learned the prospective 
memory targets, making the rest of the data easier to interpret. Recognition memory performance 
(corrected hit rate: hits - false alarms) was overall very high (M = .96, SD = .08). A 2 (target-
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response association: related vs. unrelated) x 2 (focality: focal vs. non-focal) between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a marginally significant main effect of target-response 
association, F(1, 100) = 3.68, p = .058, which showed better recognition for related (M = .98, SD 
= .05) than unrelated (M = .95, SD = .10) targets. There was no main effect of focality, F<1, and 
no interaction, F<1. Turning to the cued-recall results, I found a significant main effect of target-
response association, F(1, 100) = 27.54, p < .001, MSE = 0.03, η2p = 0.22, with better cued recall 
for related (M = .95, SD = .16) than unrelated (M = .76, SD = .20) responses. There was no main 
effect of focality, F<1, and no interaction, F(1, 100) = 1.18, p = .181. These latter results 
demonstrate that the expected relatedness effect on memory remained despite the extensive 
encoding of the intentions. 
Judgments of Learning 
JOLs were made twice, first after initial exposure to each pair and again after all the pairs 
had been studied and tested. Figures 1 and 2 show the mean JOLs for the different experimental 
conditions and time points. Because I did not anticipate any differences across the two rounds of 
JOLs, I submitted the data to two 2 (target-response association) x 2 (focality) x 2 (time) mixed 
ANOVAs (one on prospective JOLs and the other on retrospective JOLs).  
For prospective JOLs (Figure 1), the analysis revealed a significant main effect of target-
response association, F(1, 100) = 10.18, p = .002, MSE = 474.70, η2p = 0.09, with greater JOLs 
for related than unrelated intentions, and a significant main effect of time, F(1, 100) = 6.18, p = 
.015, MSE = 93.82, η2p = 0.06, with an increase in JOLs from initial to second-round predictions. 
There was no main effect of focality, F<1, no interaction between target-response association 
and focality, F(1, 100) = 1.86, p = .176, and no interactions between time and target-response 
association, F(1, 100) = 1.43, p = .235, or between time and focality, F<1. There was, however, a 
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marginally significant three-way interaction between time, target-response association, and 
focality, F(1, 100) = 3.20, p = .077. To decompose this interaction, I analyzed the data at each 
JOL time point separately using 2 (target-response association) x 2 (focality) between-subjects 
ANOVAs. 
For initial prospective JOLs, the analysis revealed a significant main effect of target-
response association, F(1, 100) = 11.36, p = .001, MSE = 289.43, η2p = 0.10, no main effect of 
focality, F<1, and no interaction, F<1. For the second-round prospective JOLs, the analysis 
again revealed a significant main effect of target-response association, F(1, 100) = 6.02, p = 
.016, MSE = 279.09, η2p = 0.06, and no main effect of focality, F<1, but a significant interaction, 
F(1, 100) = 3.96, p = .049. Decomposing this interaction revealed a significant relatedness effect 
in the focal condition, t(50) = 3.33, p = .002, but not in the non-focal condition, t(50) = 0.31, p = 
.757 . The simple effect of focality was also assessed separately for the related and unrelated 
conditions. Neither of these analyses were significant, related: t(50) = 1.69, p = .098; unrelated: 
t(50) = 1.11, p = .275. 
 
Figure 1. Mean initial and second-round prospective JOLs by focality and target-response 
association in Experiment 1. Error bars are ± 1 SE. 
 
30 
 
Turning to retrospective JOLs (Figure 2), the same 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of target-response association, F(1, 100) = 32.00, p < .001, MSE = 
500.12, η2p = 0.24, and of time, F(1, 100) = 75.16, p < .001, MSE = 91.59, η
2
p = 0.43. There was 
no main effect of focality, F<1, no interaction between target-response association and focality, 
F(1, 100) = 2.86, p = .094, and no interaction between time and target-response association, F<1, 
or between time, target-response association, and focality, F<1. However, there was a trending 
interaction between time and focality, F(1, 100) = 3.35, p = .070. This result seems to be driven 
by the finding that initial retrospective JOLs non-significantly favored focal over non-focal 
intentions, F<1, while the reverse was true for second-round JOLs (but again non-significantly), 
F<1. 
 
Figure 2. Mean initial and second-round retrospective JOLs by focality and target-response 
association in Experiment 1. Error bars are ± 1 SE. 
 
For completeness, the relative accuracy of JOLs is reported using within-subject gamma 
correlations computed between JOLs and prospective memory performance. This analysis was 
performed separately for the prospective JOLs (with prospective component memory) and the 
retrospective JOLs (with retrospective component memory). However, these data may be of 
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limited reliability given the small number of target items upon which they are based. Additional 
caution is warranted because of the amount of missing data. In the computation of gamma, ties 
on a variable are excluded (Gonzalez & Nelson, 1996). So, if a participant gave the same JOL for 
every item or recalled (or failed to recall) every item, gamma could not be calculated. This aspect 
of the gamma calculation produced the variable degrees of freedom below and in the subsequent 
experiments.  
Interestingly, all gamma correlations were significantly or marginally greater than 0. The 
correlation between initial prospective JOLs and memory for the target was positive and 
significant (G = .28, SE = .12), t(27) = 2.24, p = .033. The correlation between second-round 
prospective JOLs and target memory approached significance (G = .24, SE = .12), t(29) = 2.01, p 
= .054, and did not differ from the initial round, t(27) = 0.62, p = .543.
6
 The gamma correlation 
between initial retrospective JOLs and memory for the response was significantly greater than 0 
(G = .20, SE = .09), t(43) = 2.18, p = .035. Finally, the correlation between the second round of 
retrospective JOLs and response memory was significant (G = .57, SE = .07), t(45) = 8.07, p < 
.001, and also significantly greater than initial JOLs, t(43) = 3.85, p < .001.   
Prospective Memory Performance 
 As described earlier, prospective memory performance was assessed in two ways. The 
prospective component was measured as the proportion of times out of eight (the total number of 
targets) that the participant noted the presence of a target. This value was also conducted 
conditionalized on participants’ recognition of the targets at the end of the experiment. The 
patterns of the unconditionalized and conditionalized data are the almost identical (except where 
                                                          
6
For some participants in the current analysis and throughout the gamma correlation results, only 
a single gamma could be computed (either for the initial or second-round predictions). Therefore, 
the average values used in the paired-samples comparisons (and degrees of freedom) slightly 
differed.
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noted); therefore, only the unconditionalized data are reported. The retrospective component was 
measured as the number of times participants retrieved the correct response word given they 
recognized the target. 
 See Table 1 for mean proportion prospective memory performance for both the 
prospective and retrospective components. A 2 (target-response association: related vs. 
unrelated) x 2 (focality: focal vs. non-focal) ANOVA was conducted on memory for the 
prospective component. This analysis revealed no main effect of target-response association, 
F(1, 100) = 2.18, p = .143, no main effect of focality, F(1, 100) = 1.13, p = .290, and no 
interaction, F<1. 
The same 2 x 2 analysis conducted on memory for the retrospective component showed a 
significant main effect of target-response association, F(1, 75) = 29.94, p < .001, MSE = 0.03, η2p 
= 0.29, with better memory for related responses (M = .96, SD = .09) than unrelated responses 
(M = .74, SD = .25). There was no main effect of focality, F<1, and no interaction, F<1. 
Table 1. Mean (SE) Proportion Prospective Memory Performance for the Prospective and  
Retrospective Components in Experiment 1 
 Prospective Component Retrospective Component 
 Focal Non-Focal Focal Non-Focal 
Related Intention .79 (.07) .68 (.09) .96 (.02) .97 (.01) 
Unrelated Intention .64 (.08) .59 (.08) .73 (.05) .74 (.05) 
 
Ongoing Task Performance 
 Although not the focus of the present study, performance on the ongoing task was also 
assessed. For these computations, I assessed the accuracy and speed with which participants 
classified the letter strings as words or non-words or as having more than two vs. two-or-fewer 
vowels. For response times, incorrect trials and trials that contained prospective memory targets 
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were removed because they could skew performance (see Marsh et al., 2003; McBride & Abney, 
2012). In total, 9% of trials were removed. 
 Table 2 displays mean accuracy and response times (in milliseconds) for the ongoing 
tasks. A 2 (target-response association: related vs. unrelated) x 2 (focality: focal vs. non-focal) 
ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of correct trials. Overall, accuracy was high, at ~96%. 
The analysis revealed no main effect of target-response association, F<1, no main effect of 
focality, F<1, and no interaction, F(1, 100) = 1.06, p = .307. 
The same 2 x 2 analysis was conducted on ongoing task response times using the mean of 
each participant’s mean response times. There was a marginally significant main effect of target-
response association, F(1, 100) = 3.18, p = .077, with faster responding in the unrelated than 
related intentions condition; a significant main effect of focality, F(1, 100) = 41.93, p < .001, 
MSE = 1.91 x 10
5, η2p = 0.30, with slower response times for the non-focal (vowel counting) than 
focal (lexical decision) task; and no interaction, F<1. 
Table 2. Mean (SE) Proportion Accuracy  and Mean (SE) of the Mean Response Times (in 
Milliseconds) for the Ongoing Tasks in Experiment 1 
 Accuracy Response Times 
 Focal Non-Focal Focal Non-Focal 
Related Intention .96 (.01) .96 (.01) 1321.83 (73.68) 1898.05 (91.60) 
Unrelated Intention .96 (.01) .95 (.01) 1189.48 (62.21) 1724.34 (108.41) 
 
Discussion 
 Consistent with Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilization framework, the extrinsic cue of focality 
did not affect participants’ retrospective JOLs. Critically, the variable also failed to influence 
prospective JOLs. Further in line with cue-utilization was that the intrinsic cue of relatedness 
(target-response association) did affect retrospective JOLs. Not only that, relatedness also 
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affected prospective JOLs. Therefore, this experiment provides preliminary evidence that 
predictions about prospective memory behave similarly to those about retrospective memory.     
Participants’ predictions were generally reflective of their actual performance. Target-
response association influenced prospective memory for the retrospective component, consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Cohen et al., 2001; Marsh et al., 2003). However, the use of relatedness 
as a cue for the prospective JOLs acted as a metacognitive illusion because this variable did not 
affect memory for the target. It is unlikely that participants’ prospective JOLs were driven by a 
generalization from the retrospective JOLs because prospective JOLs were always provided first. 
However, a form of generalization cannot be completely ruled out: participants’ consistently 
high retrospective JOLs in the related condition may have carried over into their predictions of 
the targets (the prospective JOLs). Experiment 2, which will use a within-subjects manipulation 
of relatedness, will shed light on this idea because participants will (presumably) be intermixing 
high and low retrospective JOLs, reducing any overall biasing effect. I will also return to this 
broader issue in the General Discussion. 
 Furthermore, participants predicted no effect of focality and, likewise, I did not find a 
focality effect on prospective memory performance. This lack of a focality effect is inconsistent 
with the majority of prior research, which tends to show better memory for focal than non-focal 
targets. It should be noted that the results of Experiment 1 (Table 1) exhibit a numerical trend in 
the direction of a focality effect, but it was not significant. To further probe a potential effect, I 
returned to the data and noticed that 15 (14%) of the participants completely forgot the 
prospective memory aspect of the experiment. In other words, at the end of the experiment, these 
participants indicated that they noticed certain target words but failed to remember to act on 
them. Prior prospective memory research has similarly encountered this issue and occasionally 
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excludes these participants from analyses (e.g., Abney, McBride, Conte, & Vinson, 2015; 
McDaniel et al., 2004). Therefore, I reran the analyses on only those participants who had 
knowledge of the prospective memory task. The results remained largely intact but now revealed 
a significant effect of focality.
7
 Specifically, a 2 (target-response association) x 2 (focality) 
ANOVA conducted on memory for the prospective component showed better identification of 
focal targets (M = .87, SD = .25) than non-focal targets (M = .71, SD = .38), F(1, 85) = 4.81, p = 
.031, MSE = 0.10, η2p = 0.05.  
  
                                                          
7
Removing these forgetters additionally produced a main effect of target-response association on 
memory for the prospective component, with better target memory for related (M = .87, SD = 
.27) than unrelated (M = .71, SD = .37) targets, F(1, 85) = 5.04, p = .027, MSE = 0.10,  η2p = 
0.06. However, this effect became non-significant when the conditionalized data were used (p = 
.053). Additionally, the marginally significant main effect of target-response association on 
ongoing task response times became significant, F(1, 85) = 5.28, p = .024, MSE = 1.89 x 10
5
, 
η2p = 0.06, with faster responding in the unrelated intentions condition. No other changes across 
the three experiments were found when examining the data this way.
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 2 
 Experiment 1 used a between-subjects design of relatedness and found an effect on both 
retrospective JOLs and prospective JOLs. Experiment 2 moved to a within-subjects manipulation 
of relatedness. This exploration is important for a number of reasons: 1) although the effect of 
relatedness on retrospective JOLs was predicted, it should be replicated given that this is the first 
analysis of intrinsic cues in the prospective metamemory domain; 2) the effect of relatedness on 
prospective JOLs was intriguing and not predicted, and therefore should also be replicated and 
further verified; and 3) the effect on prospective JOLs could be based on a biasing effect from 
making many high retrospective JOLs in the between-subjects related condition (or many low 
JOLs in the unrelated condition), so moving to a within-subjects manipulation should be less 
biasing because the retrospective JOLs should vary between high and low confidence. Consistent 
with the previous experiment, I predict prospective memory performance and JOLs to be higher 
for the related than unrelated intentions. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-three undergraduate students from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
participated in exchange for course credit. One participant failed to follow instructions for the 
ongoing task (and performance on this task was ~60%) and was not used. The final data set 
consisted of results from 32 participants.  
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Materials, Design, and Procedure 
 The experiment was similar to Experiment 1 except that target-response association was 
manipulated within subjects and the focality manipulation was removed (the ongoing task for all 
participants was lexical decision, consistent with prior research; Marsh et al., 2003). Of the eight 
prospective memory intentions, four consisted of related targets and responses and four consisted 
of unrelated targets and responses. Relatedness was counterbalanced across participants. 
Otherwise, the task instructions and structure of the experiment were the same as in Experiment 
1.  
Results 
 Post-experiment corrected recognition accuracy was high (M = .96, SD = .05), but was 
significantly higher for the targets from related (M = .98, SD = .00) than unrelated (M = .94, SD 
= .10) intentions, t(31) = 2.68, p = .012. Final cued-recall performance, unsurprisingly, was 
better for responses from related (M = .96, SD = .09) than unrelated (M = .82, SD = .22) 
intentions, t(31) = 3.79, p = .001. 
Judgments of Learning 
See Figures 3 and 4 for the relevant JOL data. To assess whether target-response 
association affected JOLs, separate 2 (target-response association) x 2 (time) repeated-measures 
ANOVAs were conducted. The first analysis, run on the prospective JOLs (Figure 3), revealed a 
significant main effect of target-response association, F(1, 31) = 21.34, p < .001, MSE = 150.52, 
η2p = 0.41, no main effect of time, F<1, and no interaction, F(1, 31) = 1.49, p = .232.  
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Figure 3. Mean initial and second-round prospective JOLs in Experiment 2.  
Error bars are ± 1 SE. 
 
The second analysis, on retrospective JOLs (Figure 4), revealed a significant main effect 
of target-response association, F(1, 31) = 65.47, p < .001, MSE = 174.14, η2p = 0.68, a significant 
main effect of time, F(1, 31) = 31.50, p < .001, MSE = 197.81, η2p = 0.50, and a significant 
interaction, F(1, 31) = 8.71, p = .006, MSE = 94.49, η2p = 0.22. Although the effect of target-
response association was significant at both time points, the interaction suggests that the effect 
was larger at initial JOLs (d = 1.28) than second-round JOLs (d = 1.01).  
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Figure 4. Mean initial and second-round retrospective JOLs in Experiment 2.  
Error bars are ± 1 SE. 
 
As with Experiment 1, the results from relative accuracy should be taken lightly given the 
limited data being used. The gamma correlation between initial prospective JOLs and memory of 
the target did not differ from 0 (G = -.05, SE = .18), t(9) = 0.25, p = .808. Likewise, the gamma 
correlation between the second-round prospective JOLs and memory for the target did not differ 
from 0 (G = .17, SE = .20), t(9) = 0.85, p = .416, and was not different from the initial gamma, 
t(9) = 1.64, p = .135. The gamma correlation between initial retrospective JOLs and memory for 
the response was marginally greater than 0 (G = .31, SE = .15), t(14) = 2.07, p = .058. Finally, 
the gamma correlation between second-round retrospective JOLs and memory for the response 
was significantly greater than 0 (G = .71, SE = .11), t(13) = 6.24, p < .001, and significantly 
greater than the initial correlation, t(13) = 2.70, p = .018.  
Prospective Memory Performance 
Table 3 shows memory performance for the prospective and retrospective components. A 
paired-samples t-test on memory for the prospective component revealed that participants did not 
differ in their ability to identify targets of related intentions  and unrelated intentions, t(31) = 
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1.72, p = .096. Although this effect is trending, conducting the analysis on the conditionalized 
data reduces the effect (related: M = .66, SD = .44; unrelated: M = .65, SD = .44), t(31) = 0.66, p 
= .514. The same analysis on memory for the retrospective component showed that participants 
remembered significantly more related responses than unrelated responses, t(21) = 2.95, p = 
.008.  
Table 3. Mean (SE) Proportion Prospective Memory Performance for the Prospective and  
Retrospective Components in Experiment 2 
 Prospective Component Retrospective Component 
Related Intention .66 (.08) .97 (.02) 
Unrelated Intention .62 (.08) .80 (.07) 
 
Ongoing Task Performance 
Overall, ongoing task accuracy was high, at ~94%. For task response times, a total of 
10% of trials were removed due to errors and target trials. The average response latency (mean 
of the mean response times) was 1144.55 ms (SE = 44.80).   
Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 2 generally replicated Experiment 1 and coincided with 
Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilization framework. Specifically, using a within-subjects design of 
relatedness, Experiment 2 found that participants were more confident in their ability to 
remember related responses than unrelated responses, consistent with much prior research in the 
traditional JOL domain (for a review, see Mueller et al., 2013). Critically, and also consistent 
with Experiment 1, this effect carried over to confidence for identifying targets as well, with 
greater prospective JOLs in related than unrelated intentions. This latter result rules out potential 
explanations for the finding in Experiment 1. Specifically, given the between-subjects design of 
Experiment 1, it was possible that participants’ prospective JOLs were driven by an overall bias 
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to provide either high (in the related condition) or low (in the unrelated condition) JOLs. Because 
Experiment 2 mixed related and unrelated intentions, participants varied their JOLs and therefore 
would be less influenced by any general tendency to provide high or low predictions.    
 Although participants were accurately sensitive to the effect of relatedness on the 
memory for the retrospective component, their use of this variable as a cue for the prospective 
component JOLs acted as a metacognitive illusion once again: memory for identifying targets 
did not differ across relatedness. 
 The relative accuracy results were less clear than those of Experiment 1. Participants 
were again able to effectively discriminate which responses they would be able to recall, 
particularly after practicing with the intentions. However, they were less able to identify which 
targets they would be able to recognize. This difference in relative accuracy will be returned to in 
the General Discussion.  
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 3 
 Using a between-subjects design, Experiment 1 revealed that JOLs were insensitive to 
target focality. This finding provides initial evidence that an extrinsic cue does not influence 
metamemory in prospective memory. However, from the traditional JOL literature we know that 
although extrinsic cues tend to be discounted in JOLs, increasing their salience using a within-
subjects manipulation can enhance people’s sensitivity to them. For example, Koriat et al. (2004) 
assessed the effect of retention interval on JOLs, first using a between-subjects design: before 
making JOLs during encoding, participants were told they would take a test either immediately 
after studying the items, a day later, or a week later. In this design, participants’ JOLs did not 
show any sensitivity to retention interval, though retention interval did substantially affect actual 
memory performance. In a subsequent experiment, Koriat et al. used a within-subjects design in 
which, while studying each item, participants were informed when they would be tested on that 
item (either immediately after study, a day later, or a week later). Here, participants still grossly 
underestimated the effect of retention interval on memory, but their predictions did at least 
decrease with increasing retention intervals.  
The results of Koriat et al. (2004) suggest that being made aware of the contrasting levels 
of an extrinsic variable can enhance its effect on metamemory. Therefore, in contrast to 
Experiment 1’s between-subjects assessment of focality, Experiment 3 tested whether having 
participants make JOLs for both focal and non-focal targets – a within-subjects manipulation – 
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would improve sensitivity to the cue. Focality should influence actual prospective memory 
performance, and the question is whether it will now affect JOLs.   
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-two undergraduate students from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
participated in exchange for course credit. 
Materials, Design, and Procedure 
 The experiment was similar to Experiment 1 except the target-response association 
manipulation was removed and focality was assessed within subjects. All prospective memory 
intentions were unrelated target-response pairs. Unrelated intentions were selected to try to 
increase the variability in prospective memory performance so as to reduce the amount of 
missing data in the computation of relative accuracy (see above discussion). Because only four 
prospective memory targets occurred per ongoing task, the tasks were halved to maintain the 
overall percentage of target trials from the prior experiments. 
The study consisted of six main phases: instruction for the ongoing tasks; instruction, 
encoding, and prediction for the prospective memory intentions; a delay; the first ongoing task; 
the second ongoing task; and the recognition and cued-recall tests. Participants were first told 
about both ongoing tasks (using identical instructions to Experiment 1); they were informed that 
later in the experiment they would perform two tasks involving letter strings. For the focal task, 
participants would classify the letter strings as either words or non-words. This task was termed 
the “word – non-word task.” For the non-focal task, participants would determine the number of 
vowels contained in the letter strings. This task was termed the “vowel counting task.” 
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The encoding of the prospective memory intentions was identical to the prior 
experiments; however, when making their JOLs for each word pair, participants were informed 
whether that target item would occur during the lexical decision task or the vowel counting task 
(in total four targets occurred in each task). The assignment of the targets to each task was 
counterbalanced across participants. Participants were then tested on their memory for the pairs 
and rated their confidence a second time, consistent with Experiment 1. 
After encoding and predicting the intentions, participants completed a three-minute math 
distractor task. Next, participants were reminded of the first ongoing task (either lexical decision 
or vowel counting) and completed it. They then proceeded to the second ongoing task, with the 
order of the tasks and letter strings contained in each task counterbalanced across participants. 
No reference was made to the prospective memory intentions. The recognition and cued-recall 
tests were identical to above. 
Results 
 Post-experiment recognition accuracy was again very high (M = .95, SD = .07), and did 
not differ between the focal (M = .93, SD = .11) and non-focal targets (M = .96, SD = .06), t(31) 
= 1.14, p = .263. Similarly, cued-recall performance did not differ across the focal (M = .66, SD 
= .30) and non-focal (M = .77, SD = .21) conditions, t(31) = 1.60, p = .119. 
Judgments of Learning 
See Figures 5 and 6 for the relevant JOL data. Separate 2 (focality) x 2 (time) repeated-
measures ANOVAs were conducted to assess the effect of focality on prospective and 
retrospective JOLs. For prospective JOLs (Figure 5), there was no main effect of focality, F<1, 
no main effect of time, F<1, and no interaction, F<1. For retrospective JOLs (Figure 6), there 
45 
 
was likewise no main effect of focality, F(1, 31) = 1.39, p = .248, no main effect of time, F<1, 
and no interaction, F(1, 31) = 2.69, p = .111. 
 
Figure 5. Mean initial and second-round prospective JOLs in Experiment 3.  
Error bars are ± 1 SE. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean initial and second-round retrospective JOLs in Experiment 3.  
Error bars are ± 1 SE. 
 
The relative accuracy of the initial prospective JOLs was poor (G = -.18, SE = .22) and 
did not differ from 0, t(9) = 0.82, p = .434. Later prospective JOLs continued to show no 
discriminability of items (G = .07, SE = .21), t(9) = 0.35, p = .738, and accuracy did not differ 
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from the initial gamma correlation, t(9) = 0.85, p = .416. The gamma correlation between initial 
retrospective JOLs and memory for the response likewise did not differ from 0 (G = .00, SE = 
14), t(21) = 0.02, p = .988. However, the relative accuracy of the second-round retrospective 
JOLs was significantly greater than 0 (G = .54, SE = .12), t(21) = 4.71, p < .001, and 
significantly greater than the original correlation, t(21) = 2.57, p = .018. 
Prospective Memory Performance 
 See Table 4 for prospective memory performance for the prospective and retrospective 
components. Starting with memory for the target (the prospective component), a paired-samples 
t-test found that performance did not differ between the focal and non-focal conditions, t(31) = 
1.14, p = .264. Unsurprisingly, performance also did not differ on the retrospective component, 
t(19) = 1.31, p = .206. 
Table 4. Mean (SE) Proportion Prospective Memory Performance for the Prospective and  
Retrospective Components in Experiment 3 
 Prospective Component Retrospective Component 
Focal Target .64 (.08) .71 (.07) 
Non-Focal Target .58 (.08) .70 (.05) 
 
As an additional approach to assessing prospective memory performance across focality, 
I conducted a between-subjects comparison of performance only on the first ongoing task. 
Consistent with the prior results, however, memory for the prospective component was 
statistically equivalent for those who completed the focal lexical decision task first (M = .56, SD 
= .30) and the non-focal vowel counting task first (M = .63, SD = .46), t(30) = 0.38, p = .705. 
Ongoing Task Performance 
 See Table 5 for ongoing task accuracy and response times. Performance on both the 
lexical decision and vowel counting ongoing tasks was high and did not differ, t(31) = 0.13, p = 
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.900. For response times, 9% of trials were removed due to errors and target trials. Participants 
performed the lexical decision task faster than the vowel counting task, t(31) = 5.71, p < .001. 
Table 5. Mean (SE) Proportion Accuracy and Mean (SE) of the Mean Response Times (in 
Milliseconds) for the Ongoing Tasks in Experiment 3 
 Accuracy Response Times 
Focal Task (Lexical Decision) .95 (.01) 1268.26 (65.41) 
Non-Focal (Vowel Counting) .95 (.01) 1773.56 (113.15) 
 
Discussion 
 Consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 3 found that JOLs were not sensitive to the 
extrinsic cue of target focality. Critically, Experiment 3 used a within-subjects manipulation, and 
participants made predictions both for targets that would appear in the focal lexical decision task 
and the non-focal vowel counting task. This result is consistent with Koriat’s (1997) cue-
utilization framework and other studies that show poor awareness of extrinsic cues (e.g., Castel, 
2008; Kornell & Bjork, 2009). Prior research has found that using within-subjects manipulations 
of extrinsic cues can increase people’s sensitivity to them (e.g., Koriat et al., 2004). However, 
this does not appear to be the case for target focality in prospective memory.  
The current experiment (and Experiment 1) assessed awareness of extrinsic cues using a 
design that is typical of metamemory studies: participants are described the condition of learning 
(whether it be the context in which the target item will appear, the number of study opportunities, 
the retention interval, etc.) and then make their JOLs for the varying levels of that condition. 
Based on this usual methodology, I did not find evidence for an effect of the extrinsic cue of 
focality. However, it may be that participants’ lack of direct experience with the tasks reduced an 
influence even when the comparison was made salient (especially given that participants may not 
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have been able to appreciate these types of learning situations solely through a description). This 
issue will be returned to in the General Discussion. 
 In this experiment JOLs also did not increase from the initial to the second-round JOLs, 
after practice with the intention pairs. This is somewhat surprising, but given that all of the word 
pairs were unrelated and somewhat difficult to learn, participants may have used their recall 
success during the word-stem cued-recall testing phase to guide their later predictions. 
Specifically, if a participant gave a JOL of 60 to an item but then was unable to recall it during 
the test, that participant might use the failure-to-recall when making their next JOL for that item, 
and subsequently either provide a similar or lower prediction. In retrospective metamemory, this 
idea is known as the memory for past test heuristic (Finn & Metcalfe, 2007). Because the first 
two experiments integrated both related and unrelated word pairs (either between participants in 
Experiment 1 or within participants in Experiment 2), performance during the testing phase 
would presumably be better overall, and therefore participants would have more successful recall 
attempts on which to base (and potentially increase) their JOLs. 
 Although numerically in the expected direction, focality failed to influence objective 
prospective memory (the lack of an effect on the retrospective component is not surprising given 
that once a target is noticed, the nature of the task should not influence participants’ ability to 
remember the response). It is unclear why no focality effect was found, as it has been observed 
in both between- (e.g., McBride & Abney, 2012) and within-subjects (e.g., Altgassen, Kliegel, & 
Martin, 2009) designs. One plausible explanation is that the inclusion of JOLs increased the 
perceived importance of the prospective memory component of the experiment and made 
participants more likely to monitor during both ongoing tasks, which would favor non-focal 
targets. Alternatively, JOLs could have diverted participants’ attention away from the 
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prospective aspect of the experiment. Another possibility is that the inclusion of unrelated target-
response intentions sufficiently taxed participants’ memory. Typical studies of focality use a 
very simple retrospective component, such as pressing a key (e.g., Einstein et al., 2005), which 
minimizes what participants need to remember. In the current experiment, unrelated intentions 
were chosen to increase the variability in the data to get a more reliable estimate of relative 
accuracy. It is also important to note that recognition of the targets at the end of the experiment 
was still very high, suggesting that despite needing to learn eight unrelated word pairs, 
participants effectively encoded all targets. 
  
50 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Being able to accurately assess our memories is important for how we use and allocate 
our cognitive resources. Although a wealth of research has examined our ability to judge 
retrospective memory – when we know we will be asked to retrieve information later (see Bjork 
et al., 2013) – limited research has examined how we judge our prospective memory (e.g., Meier 
et al., 2011; Smith, 2015) – our ability to remember something in the future at the correct place 
and time. Critically, prospective remembering plays a big role in our daily lives (Crovitz & 
Daniel, 1984). A main goal of the current study, therefore, was to understand how people make 
predictions of their prospective memory and to determine whether the information used to guide 
these predictions resembles that used in predictions of retrospective memory.  
According to Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilization framework, people tend to use specific item-
level characteristics (intrinsic cues) when making their JOLs but fail to consider features of the 
general learning environment (extrinsic cues). Three experiments examined whether JOLs of 
prospective remembering behave similarly. Experiment 1 included target-response association 
(an intrinsic cue) and target focality (an extrinsic cue) in a between-subjects design, and 
Experiments 2 and 3 replicated and extended Experiment 1 to further dissect each individual cue 
in within-subjects designs. JOLs tapped both the prospective component of prospective 
remembering (i.e., remembering that something has to be done in response to a particular event) 
and the retrospective component (i.e., remembering the content of the intention), the latter of 
which is nearly identical to traditional JOLs. Furthermore, all experiments produced very high 
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recognition memory of the target items, supporting the notion that any prospective memory 
errors were indeed due to failures of prospective memory and not due to poor encoding of the 
items. This outcome gives confidence in interpreting the prospective memory data. 
 Across the three experiments, a consistent pattern emerged: participants’ JOLs – both the 
ones assessing retrospective remembering and true prospective remembering – were sensitive to 
the intrinsic cue of target-response association but not the extrinsic cue of focality. The null 
focality effect on JOLs remained even when focality was manipulated within subjects and 
participants were able to compare the two conditions (though not actually experience them, 
which will be discussed more below). Importantly, the results of the retrospective JOLs are 
consistent with the predictions of the cue-utilization framework (Koriat, 1997). The novel 
findings from the prospective JOLs, though, provide preliminary evidence that the types of cues 
that influence (or fail to influence) judgments of retrospective memory also influence judgments 
of prospective memory. Further, these results suggest that Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilization 
framework generalizes to this alternative JOL measure, and they set the stage for future 
comparisons between the domains of metamemory. 
 The finding that prospective JOLs were influenced by target-response association is 
particularly intriguing given that this variable did not consistently influence objective 
prospective remembering (though it did affect memory for the response, consistent with prior 
research; e.g., Marsh et al., 2003). This result is known as a metacognitive illusion and resembles 
many studies in the traditional JOL domain when a variable influences JOLs but not memory 
performance (e.g., Rhodes & Castel, 2008, 2009; Susser & Mulligan, 2015). Given that item-
relatedness strongly affects JOLs in the retrospective domain (see Mueller et al., 2013), it is 
plausible that in the current study participants’ retrospective JOLs carried over to their 
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prospective JOLs. Two points argue against this idea. First, the order of the JOLs was such that 
participants always made prospective JOLs before retrospective JOLs. Had retrospective JOLs 
been made first, it would be intuitive to think that providing a high (related) or low (unrelated) 
JOL for the response of a word pair could then be simply generalized to the target. Having 
participants always provide prospective JOLs first, though, eliminated this possibility. Second, it 
could be the case that participants were generally biased to provide high or low JOLs throughout 
the task. In other words, when participants got in the routine of making high JOLs for related 
responses, they continued with this tendency throughout, in a sort of anchoring and adjusting 
manner. This idea could account for the results of Experiment 1 that came from a between-
subjects design and had participants only respond to one type of word pair. However, in 
Experiment 2’s within-subjects manipulation, participants’ JOLs would vary from high to low 
across word pairs, making an overall bias unlikely to play a role.  
Research from the traditional metamemory field suggests that people may guide their 
JOLs using a belief that related information (particularly response words from related pairs) will 
be better remembered than unrelated information (Mueller et al., 2013). The present result 
implies that this belief extends beyond memory for the response and to memory for identifying 
the target as well. One way to more concretely explore this idea would be to use some of the 
methods used in retrospective metamemory research. For example, research could implement a 
questionnaire that describes a study involving related and unrelated word pairs, but in which only 
memory for the first word of each pair was tested. Participants could then predict how many of 
each type of word would be remembered. If the pattern remained the same (i.e., greater JOLs for 
targets from related pairs than unrelated pairs), it would suggest that people do have this sort of 
belief. 
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Another possibility stems from the method used to elicit JOLs in the present experiments. 
Specifically, participants were presented with the entire word pair when making both the 
prospective and retrospective JOLs. So, even when participants were predicting memory for the 
target, seeing the relation between the target and response may have biased their JOLs. To 
untangle this idea, a follow-up study could show the relevant words individually: when asking 
for prospective JOLs, only the target word of the pair would be shown, and when asking for 
retrospective JOLs, only the response would be shown. 
Target focality, on the other hand, generally failed to influence prospective memory, 
making participants’ JOLs accurately sensitive. The lack of a focality effect on prospective 
memory, however, is generally inconsistent with the prior literature (e.g., Altgassen et al., 2009; 
Einstein et al., 2005; McBride & Abney, 2012). Although both Experiments 1 and 3 found a 
numeric trend in the expected direction favoring focal targets, the pattern was not significant. 
(Experiment 1  did find a significant benefit of focal targets, though, when those data of only 
participants who remembered the prospective memory task were analyzed).  
Research in retrospective metamemory has found that item-by-item JOLs can have 
reactive effects on performance, reducing or eliminating typical memory phenomena (e.g., 
Besken & Mulligan, 2013, 2014). For example, Besken and Mulligan (2013) examined 
metamemory in the perceptual interference effect, which is the finding that words that are 
presented briefly (e.g., 100 ms) and then backward-masked are better recalled than words 
presented visually intact for the entire study duration (e.g., 2.5 s; Mulligan & Lozito, 2004). In 
two experiments, Besken and Mulligan presented a mix of masked and intact words and had 
participants make JOLs for the two types of items. In one experiment, participants made JOLs 
immediately following each item. In the other experiment, aggregate JOLs were made at the end 
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of the entire study list and participants predicted how many of the items of each type they would 
remember. Both experiments found that participants were more confident in remembering the 
intact items. More importantly, though, the memory advantage for the masked items (i.e., the 
perceptual interference effect) only emerged when aggregate JOLs were used; item-by-item 
JOLs eliminated the effect. One potential explanation for this reactivity is that JOLs induced 
deeper processing of the study items, and this deeper processing selectively benefited the intact 
items. Alternatively, making JOLs may have directed attention away from the study items and, in 
particular, reduced the deep processing typically afforded to the masked items (see also Besken 
& Mulligan, 2014).  
Similarly, recent findings in prospective metamemory have suggested that making 
predictions can alter performance and how people engage with the ongoing tasks (Meier et al., 
2011; Rummel, Kuhlmann, & Touron, 2012). For example, Meier et al. had participants 
complete a prospective memory task in which half of the participants responded to a specific 
prospective memory target (respond whenever the word “trumpet” appears in the context of a 
short-term memory task) and the other half to a general category of targets (respond whenever a 
word for a musical instrument appears). Furthermore, half of the participants responded to a 6-
item prediction questionnaire after learning about the prospective memory intention. The other 
half did not. Meier et al. found that making performance predictions boosted performance of the 
categorical intention condition but did not influence the specific intention condition. 
Additionally, making predictions was associated with increased self-reported searching for the 
target, and the researchers reasoned that the predictions may have elevated the perceived 
importance of the prospective memory task. Relating these findings to the present study, it is 
possible that having participants make item-by-item JOLs enhanced participants’ later 
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monitoring of the targets, and this monitoring more strongly benefited the non-focal condition. 
On the other hand, it also seems reasonable to think that making the JOLs may have distracted 
participants from the prospective memory aspect of the study and impaired performance more 
for the usually well-remembered focal condition. Therefore, a potential follow-up study could 
substitute aggregate JOLs in place of item-by-item measurements to assess whether reactivity is 
playing a role in the current design.  
Although not a primary focus of the study, examining relative accuracy produced 
interesting (and somewhat mixed) results. As noted above, though, these data should be taken 
with caution given that they are based on a limited number of items (unlike typical retrospective 
memory studies, which include many study items) and because of the amount of missing data 
brought about by the computation of gamma correlations. Relative accuracy was calculated 
separately for the prospective and retrospective aspects of the intentions, and for the prospective 
component, Experiment 1 found that participants displayed rather accurate predictions. However, 
Experiments 2 and 3 painted a different picture: participants had poor insight into their future 
memory for which targets they would identify.  
One potential explanation for the generally weak prospective relative accuracy is that 
participants made JOLs without having direct experience with the ongoing task or experience 
with recognizing targets embedded in the task. That is, the memory context was unfamiliar. In 
retrospective metamemory studies, in contrast, participants have more familiarity with basic 
recall and recognition tests, which are at least somewhat similar to the memory tests and 
challenges they have experienced in the past. The structure of prospective memory studies is 
much different. And indeed, in the current study relative accuracy for the retrospective 
component was generally better, especially for the second-round JOLs. The high accuracy of 
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these JOLs made after practice is consistent with the finding that relative accuracy increases 
across study-test cycles (e.g., Koriat et al. 2002) as people can better discriminate among items. 
The mixed relative accuracy in the current study is somewhat inconsistent with prior 
research (Knight et al., 2005; Schnitzspahn et al., 2011) that has found, using gamma 
correlations, that people can show metacognitive insight at the item level. These discrepancies in 
findings could stem from the more basic calculation issues regarding gamma discussed above. 
For example, Knight et al. (2005) and Schnitzspahn et al. (2011) both  included more prospective 
memory intentions (20 and 10), which would make their assessments more reliable. However, 
Knight et al. requested just a single prediction for each intention (i.e., did not distinguish 
between the prospective and retrospective components), so it is difficult to fully interpret their 
results in comparison with the current findings. Schnitzspahn et al. did tease apart the two 
components in their predictions and generally found better accuracy, particularly for the 
prospective component. It is possible that their ongoing task was easier for participants to 
evaluate (participants needed to click on prospective memory targets embedded in a story they 
were reading) and provided them with more insight into which items they would remember. 
Additionally, although this design seemed to produce less variability in the data (particularly on 
prospective component memory), it is possible their outcomes resulted in fewer ties and less 
missing data (unfortunately, the researchers did not report this information). Overall, it is evident 
that research needs to be conducted to further assess relative accuracy in prospective memory.  
Limitations 
 The current study integrated the typical designs of both prospective memory and 
metamemory. Although it effectively enabled me to broadly assess both topics, it limited some of 
particular questions I could answer within each domain. For example, the assessment of relative 
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accuracy was rather limited. Because this measurement is calculated within participants at the 
item level, to obtain a reliable estimate, many items per participant are needed (Spellman, 
Bloomfield, & Bjork, 2008). However, at the same time, prospective memory research typically 
uses a limited number target items, and increasing the number of targets can alter performance 
and the emphasis of the task (e.g., Einstein et al., 2005). I attempted to find a balance in the 
current study, but a goal of future research will to be continue to identify ways of assessing item-
level accuracy. 
Likewise, the focality of a prospective memory target has been a focus of research on 
prospective memory, primarily because of its theoretical importance (McDaniel & Einstein, 
2000, 2007a). A large body of research is dedicated to understanding how people engage with 
the ongoing task. With focality, one particular way of assessing ongoing task processing is to 
compare how long people take to respond to the task across focal and non-focal conditions (or a 
comparison can be made with a baseline block of trials when no prospective memory intentions 
are to be responded to). Research generally finds that people perform the ongoing task more 
slowly when non-focal targets are used, an indication that people are monitoring more and 
devoting more resources to finding the targets (e.g., Altgassen et al., 2009; Einstein et al., 2005). 
However, to make this assessment, the same ongoing task needs to be performed across the focal 
and non-focal conditions. Indeed, focality is traditionally assessed by holding the ongoing task 
constant while altering the prospective memory target (e.g., using lexical decision with word 
targets [producing a focal condition] or with syllable targets [producing a non-focal condition]). I 
wanted all of the target items to be words so participants would be predicting memory for typical 
word stimuli; therefore, I manipulated the type of ongoing task (consistent with McBride & 
Abney, 2012). Because the tasks themselves differed, any differences in response times could be 
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due to task difficulty and not the focality of the targets. An ongoing follow-up study incorporates 
a baseline practice block to better be able to draw conclusions regarding attention allocation in 
the ongoing tasks.    
Future Directions 
 The results of Experiments 1 and 3 suggested that participants did not have any 
sensitivity to the extrinsic cue of focality. This finding is generally consistent with the traditional 
JOL literature, which has found that people often fail to appreciate cues that are part of the 
broader learning environment but not inherent in the items themselves (e.g., Castel, 2008; Koriat 
et al., 2004). Furthermore, the design used in the current experiments reflects that of typical 
metamemory studies assessing sensitivity to extrinsic cues (e.g., Koriat et al., 2004; Kornell & 
Bjork, 2009). Specifically, these cues, because they represent conditions of the learning context, 
are often merely described to participants (such as by telling participants how many study 
opportunities they will have or when the memory test will occur) and are not directly 
experienced. Likewise, in our experiments, participants did not have any experience with the 
focal and non-focal tasks before making their predictions, and without any prior exposure to 
these tasks (presumably), participants would have had to base their JOLs purely on beliefs 
devoid of any concrete experience.  
It is plausible, however, that for participants to demonstrate any sensitivity to extrinsic 
cues, some prior experience needs to be drawn upon. As an example, participants in Koriat et 
al.’s (2004) study surely had experience with forgetting before taking part in the experiment and 
could have used this experience to inform their JOLs (especially when a within-subjects design 
was used). Consequently, an important follow-up study (which is ongoing) to the current 
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experiments is to have participants practice the ongoing task prior to providing their JOLs. The 
direct interaction with the tasks may increase people’s awareness of their potential effects. 
 In addition to examining what cues influence JOLs, a current emphasis in metamemory 
research is to understand how these cues exert their influence (e.g., Koriat et al., 2004; Mueller et 
al., 2013; Susser, Jin, & Mulligan, 2016). Specifically, a cue can affect JOLs through direct 
fluency-based processing of the relevant stimuli, through an a priori belief that people have about 
a cue, or through a belief that develops over the course of an experiment. For example, when 
encoding to-be-learned material, certain stimuli may be easier to process, perceive, or produce 
than other stimuli (e.g., Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005; Susser & Mulligan, 2015). This difference in 
fluency processing may then translate into differences in JOLs, with greater fluency typically 
being associated with greater confidence (e.g., Besken & Mulligan, 2014; Undorf & Erdfelder, 
2015).  
Alternatively, people may come into an experiment with a belief about how some 
variable affects memory. Kornell et al. (2011) used a questionnaire to assess people’s beliefs 
about the effect of font size on memory. Participants read a description about a prior experiment 
examining font size and they then predicted how many words of each type (large font or small 
font) they would be able to recall. Solely through reading this description, and without 
experiencing any words themselves, participants reported more confidence in remembering the 
large- than small-font items, suggesting that a belief about font size guided predictions (see also, 
Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014).  
It is also possible that participants do not have an a priori belief about a cue, but that as 
they interact with the study materials and engage with the experiment, they develop one over 
time. This type of belief is often assessed with a measure known as a pre-study JOL, which is a 
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JOL made before a particular item but that informs the participant what type of item is upcoming 
(whether it be a related pair vs. an unrelated pair, a large-font item vs. a small-font item, etc.). 
This design minimizes any potential effect of fluency processing because JOLs are made prior to 
interaction with a specific stimulus. Although much more research needs to be done to assess the 
more basic question of what cues affect prospective metamemory, a logical next step would be to 
examine how these different influences play a role. This pursuit would be an additional way to 
integrate the two bodies of metamemory research.   
 Finally, understanding how people make JOLs and monitor their memory performance is 
particularly important because of its proposed link to control behaviors, or ways people decide to 
use their cognitive resources (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994; Rhodes & Castel, 2009). For 
example, if you think you are unlikely to remember to carry out an action later on, do you then 
do something about it in hopes of preventing a memory failure? That is, if memory monitoring 
predicts that you are unlikely to remember something later, do you decide to engage in control 
processes to try to change that predicted outcome?  Within prospective memory, control 
behaviors range from spending more time encoding intentions, to setting reminders, to allocating 
more attention to the ongoing task surroundings. Therefore, a critical endeavor in research on 
prospective metamemory will be to investigate how predictions made at encoding relate to these 
various control behaviors.  
In ongoing task performance, the basic prospective memory laboratory paradigm already 
has a built-in control measure: if participants judge an intention to be difficult to carry out, they 
may allocate more attention to it in the interim, during the “performance phase” of the ongoing 
task. Indeed, Hicks et al. (2005) proposed that, upon learning about the ongoing and prospective 
memory tasks, people decide how to allocate their attention in the ongoing task. In particular, 
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Hicks et al. stated that people use their predictions about how easy it will be to fulfill a 
prospective memory intention to determine how to allocate resources later. Further testing this 
idea would be an ideal place to start investigating control processes in prospective metamemory.    
Conclusions 
 The current study takes an important step in helping us understand how people judge 
their prospective memory. Consistent with predictions of retrospective remembering, predictions 
of prospective memory seem to be based primarily on information stemming from the to-be-
remembered information and not on external, situational factors. Not only do these findings 
nicely bridge the retrospective and prospective metamemory domains, but they also open the 
door for many follow-up investigations to further connect the two. With continuing interest in 
metamemory processes more generally (see Dunlosky & Tauber, 2015) and the applied 
relevance of prospective remembering, pursuits of metamemory in prospective memory should 
be fruitful for years to come. 
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